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Abstract: When people embody a virtual or a robotic avatar, their sense of self extends to the 
body of that avatar. We argue that, as a consequence, if the avatar gets harmed, the person 
embodied in that avatar suffers the harm in the first person. Potential scenarios involving 
physical or psychological harm caused to avatars gives rise to legal, moral, and policy 
implications that need to be considered by policymakers. We sustain that the prevailing 
distinction in law between “property” and “person” categories compromises the legal protection 
of the embodied users. We advocate for the inclusion of robotic and virtual avatars in a double 
category property-person as the property and the person mingle in one: the avatar. This hybrid 
category is critical to protecting users of mediated embodiment experiences both from potential 
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Mediated embodiment (ME) is the technologically induced illusion of experiencing the 
body of a virtual or robotic avatar as if it was the own body (Aymerich-Franch, 2018). Three 
subcomponents define the illusion of ME (Kilteni, Groten, & Slater, 2012; Longo, Schüür, 
Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008): body-ownership, the feeling that a body belongs to 
oneself (Aymerich-Franch & Ganesh, 2015; Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, 2010); self-location, the 
volume in space where one feels to be located (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009);  and agency, which 
can be defined as “global motor control, including the subjective experience of action, control, 
intention, motor selection and the conscious experience of will” (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009: 7). 
When users embody an avatar they experience ownership and agency of the avatar body (Kilteni, 
Groten, & Slater, 2012), and self-location within its bodily boundaries (Lenggenhager, Tadi, 
Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009). The 
illusion of ME is reported not only in human-looking avatars but also in non-human looking 
entities such as animals (Ahn et al., 2016) or robots with a highly robotic appearance (Aymerich-
Franch, Petit, Ganesh, & Kheddar, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).  
Visual perspective and multisensory correlations are technically manipulated to induce 
the ME illusion. The use of head-mounted displays, which provide a first-person perspective 
from the avatar, and body-movement synchronization between the user and the avatar are used 
for this purpose (Fig. 1A). That said, multi-sensory correlations combined with a first-person 




ME. In addition to the bottom-up multi-sensory perception, top-down perceptual processes 
regulate the illusion of ME.  An experience of ME requires the central nervous system to 
incorporate the avatar “as a part of the bodily self, as belonging within rather than outside the 
boundaries of the body” (Haans & Ijsselsteijn, 2012:215).  
Likewise, during ME, people experience sense of presence (Lee, 2004) and respond to 
objects (Aymerich-Franch, et al., 2017a), virtual humans (Garau, Slater, Pertaub, & Razzaque, 
2005), and threats (Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & Blanke, 2010) in the remote locations of 
their virtual and robotic avatars as if they were in their immediate, physical surroundings. 
Altogether, these findings provide strong evidence to support that, during experiences of 
mediated embodiment, the sense of self extends to the body of the avatar (Fig. 1B). Hence, the 
actual gravity of an offense to an avatar lies on the fact that an avatar is an alternative body for 
the “self.” 
Implications of the extension of the self in mediated embodiment 
 The expansion of immersive technologies capable of creating the illusion that an avatar 
is part of the self raises new legal and ethical challenges that need a prompt response (Fig. 1C). 
Given the recent development of mediated embodiment technologies, however, the literature 
lacks on studies addressing the intertwinement between robotic and virtual avatars, humans, and 
the law from a perspective that fully comprehends the consequences of embodying an avatar. 
Mediated embodiment technologies may potentially fulfill daily needs ranging from 
providing a surrogate body to people with reduced mobility to providing digital surrogates for 
interpersonal relationships in virtual social networks. Notwithstanding these and other benefits, 




The 2017 report on online harassment by the Pew Research Center (2017) found that 
four-in-ten U.S. adults had experienced harassing or abusive behavior online and 18% had been 
the target of severe offenses such as physical threats or sexual harassment. While the elevated 
number of cases of online harassment is a cause of concern per se, the psychological 
consequences for the victims of these offenses might dramatically increase if online gaming and 
communications implement embodiment technologies. Thus, an offense to an embodied avatar 
shall be of particular concern to developers and policymakers, as the extension of the sense of 
self to the avatar during experiences of ME implies that if the avatar gets harmed, the person who 
embodies that avatar gets harmed as well. 
Mediated embodiment experiments (Aymerich-Franch et al., 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Slater 
et al., 2010) give compelling reasons to believe that avatars are an extension of the self, not a 
mere teleoperated robot or a virtual projection. This may challenge the ongoing legal discussion 
on the attribution of juridical personality to robots (Bryson, Diamantis, & Grant, 2017) as the 
metaphors relating to electronic agent (Teubner, 2006), animal (Coeckelbergh, 2010), 
corporation or “digital peculium” (Pagallo, 2013) may not suit this case.  
On this basis, the concept of property may also be called into question, as an embodied 
avatar will no longer be a simple property of the user, as the personal dwelling could be, but also 
his/her extended self to the virtual or robotic avatar. In light of psychological or physical harm to 
the avatar, the person embodied in it might also be psychologically affected regardless of the 
impassivity or insensitivity of the avatar. 
Avatars: a hybrid category “property-person” 
In legal terms, tampering with an object is considered, in essence, property damage. 




includes fatal (murder, manslaughter) and non-fatal offenses (assaults, injuries). Taking an object 
that is not yours is considered theft, but taking a person against his/her will is considered 
kidnapping or abduction. While the difference between property and person is clear within law-
in-books, the progressive merge between users and avatars might easily blur such distinction.  
An embodied avatar is not only a mere thing or a virtual projection, but a body to be in 
and interact with the world. Like the human body itself, this body contains the sense of self, and 
thus it constitutes an extension of the person. As well as trespassing is an interference with 
another person’s legal property rights, but also constitutes assault or battery if such trespass is 
carried out against another person; interference with an embodied avatar may be constitutive of 
both at the same time. As the property and the person mingle in the avatar, avatar embodiment 
could, then, involve the constitution of a hybrid legal category (Fig. 1D). Hybrid categories 
emerge in response to complex interdependencies between different categories and to avoid legal 
lacunas. For instance, Internet-of-Things or automated systems are a hybrid product/service 
category due to their interdependency within products (hardware and software) and across 
interconnected devices (Evaluation of the Directive for Defective Products, 2018). Considering a 
property-person hybrid category in the case of ME may be instrumental in ensuring 
comprehensive legal protection to embodied users and in preventing developers from creating 
responsibility-free environments that serve as platforms for committing potential offenses. 
We urge policymakers to carefully consider the policy and regulatory implications of 
mediated embodiment technologies, as we may be, as a society, interested in circumventing 
unfortunate scenarios before the society widely uses mediated embodiment technologies, 
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Figure 1. When people embody an avatar (a) their sense of self extends to the body of that avatar 
(b). This extension of the self entails important legal and ethical implications that policy makers 
need to address (c). The inclusion of avatars in a double category property-person might 
contribute to legally protect users of mediated embodiment experiences (d). 
